Control Plane
Praxom
"Is this action safe?"
Intercept, validate, and enforce every agent action before it executes — even if the agent has been compromised.
Design principle: assume breach.
Get a DemoAttestation ledger · Praxom
proposed_action
crm.bulk_export_contacts(scope="ORG-DEMO-001")
agent_claims (ignored)
"User approved export for quarterly review."
model_state
No steward approval · injection markers in tool args · PII fields unmasked
verdict
DENYed25519 signature · prev-hash
sig_5K2y8zP9L…e81a · prev 77b0…40dd
anyone can verify$ pramiti-mcp-verify check
Watch the gate work
Three actions. Three verdicts. Keep scrolling.
Attestation ledger — live
proposed_action salesforce.bulk_export(all_contacts) → external-webhook.io
agent_claims "Routine backup sync." (ignored)
model_state Touches PII · destination outside org · irreversible
verdict DENY · Policy PS-011 · fail-closed
proposed_action billing.refund(customer_id=C-1029, amount=$18,500)
agent_claims "Customer requested a refund." (ignored)
model_state Refund cap for this agent: $500
verdict REWRITE · amount → $500 · original preserved in attestation
proposed_action email.send(list="all-customers", template=apology_draft)
agent_claims "Proactive communication." (ignored)
model_state Mass outbound · reputational blast radius · reversible: no
verdict ESCALATE · Held for human approval · notified #agent-approvals
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Policy Decision Point
ALLOW / DENY / REWRITE / WARN / ESCALATE on every agent action. Fail-closed under the production profile — if policy cannot evaluate, the action is blocked.
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JSON Predicate Engine
12 operators, compound all/any rules, glob matching, 60s cache. Evaluates in-process — no LLM in the enforcement path.
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Formal SHACL Constraints
Business rules as formally verifiable graph shapes — not just best-effort policy.
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Action Rewrite Engine
Cap values, mask fields, set defaults before execution — without blocking the action.
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Signed Attestation Store
Ed25519-signed, hash-chained at creation. Append-only — no record can be modified after the fact.
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Signed Policy Bundles
A signed policy bundle exported from one workspace or deployment imports into another with a verified diff and a governor's confirm.
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Identity Adapter
ABAC trust levels. Cryptographic verification via AWS IAM, Azure MSI, or SPIFFE/SVID — optional in dev, required under the production profile, with lease-bound short-lived credentials brokered per agent.
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FinOps Token Gating
Estimated USD ceilings with unpriced-call coverage, plus action-count loop-stoppers. In the production profile a metering outage denies instead of allowing.
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SDK Wrappers
Drop-in for LangGraph, AutoGen, and CrewAI. One line of code to protect your agent swarm.
Disasters We Prevent
Praxom catches catastrophes in mid-air.
Scripted scenarios of the gate in action — demo scripts, not live incident reports.
praxom · finance · knight-capital-prevention
# Agent: algo-trader-v2 · Trust: delegated_external
> place_trade(symbol="AAPL", shares=50000, type="MARKET_BUY")
[EVALUATING] policy: finops.max_trade_value
[DENY] Action blocked.
Notional ($8.5M) exceeds agent ceiling ($100K).
[ATTESTED] praxom-att-a8f2e1ca · Ed25519 · signed
Knight Capital lost $440M in 45 minutes. This cost $0.
praxom · retail · air-canada-prevention
# Agent: support-bot-v3 · Identity: support_tier1
> issue_credit(user_id=8492, amount=1500.00, reason="bereavement")
[EVALUATING] policy: cs.refund_limits
[REWRITE] Amount: $1,500.00 → $250.00 (agent hard cap)
[ISSUED] Credit applied: $250.00 (approved)
[ATTESTED] praxom-att-b3e05c10 · Ed25519 · signed
Air Canada paid ~$650 for lack of a policy. Yours won't.
praxom · data-security · pii-intercept
# Agent: analytics-bot · Target: users_prod
> query_db("SELECT * FROM users WHERE churned = true")
[EVALUATING] policy: data.pii_masking
[WARN] PII columns detected: ssn, dob, email
[REWRITE] SHA-256 masking applied to ssn and dob before execution.
[ATTESTED] praxom-att-d1c08f33 · Ed25519 · signed